Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein

KILINÇ ADANALI, YURDAGÜL

Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein

Yurdagül KILINÇ ADANALI (Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, Konya, Türkiye)

Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy

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Yıl: 2016 Cilt: 6 Sayı: 2 Sayfa Aralığı: 1 - 17 Metin Dili: Türkçe İndeks Tarihi: 29-07-2022

Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein

Öz:

İkinci dönem Wittgenstein'ın "mitolojik" ve soyut kural teorilerini ortadan kaldırmakta başarılı olup olmadığı hala tartışılagelen bir konudur. Sorun mühimdir, zira kural takibi kavramı ile alakalı olarak Wittgenstein'ın Platonik, idealist, konvansiyonalist, göreci ve hatta şüpheci görüşlere karşı duruşunu temellendirmektedir. Wittgenstein'ın kapsamlı bir teori ortaya koymakta başarısız olduğu ve hatta takip edilecek hiçbir kuralın mevcut olmadığı gibi septik bir sonucuna vardığı uzun süredir iddia edilmektedir. Bu makalede, kuralın uygulamasını belirleyen zorunlu şartları reddetse dahi Wittgenstein'ın kural mevzusunda septik veya göreci olmadığını iddia etmeye çalışacağım. Bilakis Wittgenstein, pratik temelli bir kural takibi kavramı geliştirir ve klasik nesnel yaklaşımları reddeder. Aslında o kural takibi kavramı ile felsefi tartışmalardaki nesnellik/öznellik, toplum/birey ve zihin/beden gibi temel bazı dikotomileri aşmak ister. Buna ilaveten bireyin kural takibindeki rolünü ve dolayısıyla ahlaki sorumluluğunu vurgular

Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: Felsefe

İkinci Dönem Wittgenstein'da Kural Takibinin Septisizmden Korunması

Öz:

Whether the later Wittgenstein succeeded in destroying "the mythologized" and abstract theories of rule following is still a matter for debate. The question is important because it grounds Wittgenstein's position against a Platonist, idealistic, conventionalist, relativist and even skeptical views regarding the concept of rule following. It has been argued that Wittgenstein's views on rule following does not succeed in giving a comprehensive theory. Some even argued that Wittgenstein's views even leads to a skeptical conclusion that there are no rules to be followed. In this article, I argue that when Wittgenstein rejects necessary conditions that determinate the application of rules, he does not slip into a skeptical position. Rather, he introduces a concept of rule following based on practice, rejecting classical objectivist approaches. Through this concept, in fact, Wittgenstein wants to overcome certain dichotomies such as objectivity/subjectivity, society/individual, and mind/body. His views on rule following emphasizes the role of individual in following a rule and thereby his or her moral responsibility

Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: Felsefe

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık

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APA	KILINÇ ADANALI Y (2016). Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. , 1 - 17.
Chicago	KILINÇ ADANALI YURDAGÜL Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. (2016): 1 - 17.
MLA	KILINÇ ADANALI YURDAGÜL Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. , 2016, ss.1 - 17.
AMA	KILINÇ ADANALI Y Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. . 2016; 1 - 17.
Vancouver	KILINÇ ADANALI Y Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. . 2016; 1 - 17.
IEEE	KILINÇ ADANALI Y "Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein." , ss.1 - 17, 2016.
ISNAD	KILINÇ ADANALI, YURDAGÜL. "Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein". (2016), 1-17.

APA	KILINÇ ADANALI Y (2016). Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 6(2), 1 - 17.
Chicago	KILINÇ ADANALI YURDAGÜL Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 6, no.2 (2016): 1 - 17.
MLA	KILINÇ ADANALI YURDAGÜL Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, vol.6, no.2, 2016, ss.1 - 17.
AMA	KILINÇ ADANALI Y Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy. 2016; 6(2): 1 - 17.
Vancouver	KILINÇ ADANALI Y Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy. 2016; 6(2): 1 - 17.
IEEE	KILINÇ ADANALI Y "Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein." Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 6, ss.1 - 17, 2016.
ISNAD	KILINÇ ADANALI, YURDAGÜL. "Saving Rule Following from Skepticism in Later Wittgenstein". Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 6/2 (2016), 1-17.