Yıl: 2006 Cilt: 20 Sayı: 2 Sayfa Aralığı: 139 - 148 Metin Dili: Türkçe İndeks Tarihi: 29-07-2022

A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game

Öz:
Makalemiz uluslar arası ticarete konu olan koruma duvarlarının etkilerini karşılaştırmakta ve bu koruma araçlarının hangisinin daha etkin sonuçlar verecegi konusunu oyun teorisi çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Modelimiz Copland vd. (1989) den yola çıkıp bu modeli iki ülkeli bir model olmaktan çıkarıp, n ülke için geçerli olacak şekilde genişletmiştir. Eger ülkeler stratejilerini “ortaklık (partnership) oyunu” çerçevesinde oluştururlarsa, ticaretten elde edecekleri kazanclar da onu göre daha yüksek olacaktır. Saf stratjilerin yanında karışık strateji oyunlarının da dikkate alınması bu kazancı daha artıracaktır. Makalemiz bu çerçevede pazarlık gücü oyununu analiz etmiş ve ilgili stratejileri teorik olarak tartışmıştır.
Anahtar Kelime: tarife uluslararası ticaret anlaşmalı oyun nash dengesi kota

Konular: İşletme İktisat

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Öz:
In this paper we tried to analyze three country bargaining game, using Copland, Tower and Webb (1989) model in which they used two -country model. Our results proved that if two country act cooperatively, their bargaining power will be bigger, and they will extract some of the gains of country 1, which is relatively smaller. Country 1 prefers constrained quotas to constrained tarifffs. All countries prefer unconstrained tarifffs to constrained tarifffs while their ranking of the constrained versus unconstrained quota regimes depends on their relative bargaining power. In addition to pure strategy bargaining game, we also barrowed Copeland’s (1989) model to show the implications of the mixed strategy Nash solution. If both trading partners do not use traditional protection tools separately, the Nash solution will also be different. Strategic solutions will be determined depending upon the bargaining powers of the trading partners.
Anahtar Kelime: partnership game nash solution quota tariff international trade

Konular: İşletme İktisat
Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA BEKMEZ S, BAYDUR C (2006). A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. , 139 - 148.
Chicago BEKMEZ Selahattin,BAYDUR Cem M. A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. (2006): 139 - 148.
MLA BEKMEZ Selahattin,BAYDUR Cem M. A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. , 2006, ss.139 - 148.
AMA BEKMEZ S,BAYDUR C A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. . 2006; 139 - 148.
Vancouver BEKMEZ S,BAYDUR C A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. . 2006; 139 - 148.
IEEE BEKMEZ S,BAYDUR C "A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game." , ss.139 - 148, 2006.
ISNAD BEKMEZ, Selahattin - BAYDUR, Cem M.. "A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game". (2006), 139-148.
APA BEKMEZ S, BAYDUR C (2006). A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 20(2), 139 - 148.
Chicago BEKMEZ Selahattin,BAYDUR Cem M. A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 20, no.2 (2006): 139 - 148.
MLA BEKMEZ Selahattin,BAYDUR Cem M. A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, vol.20, no.2, 2006, ss.139 - 148.
AMA BEKMEZ S,BAYDUR C A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2006; 20(2): 139 - 148.
Vancouver BEKMEZ S,BAYDUR C A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2006; 20(2): 139 - 148.
IEEE BEKMEZ S,BAYDUR C "A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game." Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 20, ss.139 - 148, 2006.
ISNAD BEKMEZ, Selahattin - BAYDUR, Cem M.. "A Theoratical Consideration on Tariffs, Quotas and Partnership Game". Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 20/2 (2006), 139-148.