The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience
Yıl: 2008 Cilt: 22 Sayı: 1 Sayfa Aralığı: 31 - 49 Metin Dili: Türkçe İndeks Tarihi: 29-07-2022
The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience
Öz: Rogoff’a göre ekonomi politikalarındaki değişiklik, ekonomik dalgalanmalara neden olmaktadır. Uzun dönemde ekonomik politikaları ortalama çıktı miktarını etkilemeksizin enflasyondaki dalgalanmaları arttırmaktadır. Rogoff’cu bir perspektiften enflasyonmdaki istikrarsızlık para politikasını yürütme görevi bağımsız bir temsilciye bırakılarak aşılabilir. Bu çalışma Rogoff’un geliştirdiği modele dayanarak TCMB’nin yasal bağımsızlığını analiz etmektedir. TCMB’nin bağımsızlığı Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992) ve Cukierman (1994) endekslerinden faydalanılarak hesaplanmakta ve Nisan 2001 de yenilenen TCMB kanunun TCMB bağımsızlığını geliştirip geliştirmediği de araştırlmaktadır. Test sonuçları TCMB’nin bağımsızlığı ile enflasyon arasında negatif bir ilişkinin olduğunu işaret etmektedir. Bununla birlikte merkez bankasının bağımsızlığı ile çıktı istikrarı arasında bir ilişki bulunamamıştır.
Anahtar Kelime: Konular:
-
Öz: According to Rogoff, economic variables may fluctuate due to changes in economic policies. In the long run, economic policies result in increases in fluctuations in inflation rate without increasing average output level. From the perspective of Rogoff, problems regarding inflation instability can be overcame by giving the authority of making monetary policy to an independent institution. This study analyzes “legal independence” of the CBRT according to the theoretical framework developed by Rogoff. In addition, we tested independence of the CBRT by using Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992) and Cukierman (1994) index, and concluded that independency of the CBRT has increased after a new law introduced in April 2001. Our econometric tests indicated that there is a negative relationship between inflation rate and independency of the CBRT. We could not, however, found any evidence to accept or reject the hypothesis of “an independent central bank results in a stable output level.”
Anahtar Kelime: Konular:
Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
- Alesina Alberto, Gatti Roberto, (1995), “How Independent Should The Central Bank Be?: Indepent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?”,American Economic Review, 85/2, pp.196-200.
- Alesina Alberto, Summers, Lawrence. (1993), “Central Bank Indepence and Macro Economic Performans: Some Comparative Evidence”, Juornal of Money And Banking, pp.151-162.
- Barro, Robert. (1984), “Recent Developments in the theory Rules versus Dsicretion”, The Econonmic Journal, Vol.96.
- Baydur, Cem, Mehmet and Süslü, Bora, (2002), “Anchors in Implementation of Monetary Policies in Turkey in 1990”,s, ISE Review, Vol:6 No: 21, pp-37-87.
- Baydur Cem Mehmet, Süslü Bora,(2003) “Sargent ve Wallace Açısından Para Politikasına Bakış: Sıkı Para Politikası Enflasyonu Engellemez:TCMB’nin Para Politikasının 1989-2002 Yılları İçin Değerlendirilmesi”, Gazi İktisat Dergisi, Cit:5, Sayı:2, ss.67-80.
- Bekmez, S., Baydur, C. M. and Bakimli, E. “Inflation Uncertainty and Risk Premium in Interest Rates: Case of Turkey” Proceedings of International Conference on Policy Modeling, Paris, France, June 29-July 2, 2004
- Berument, Hakan, ve Bilin Neyaptı,(1999) “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası ne Kadar Bağımsız?”, İşletme ve Finans, ss.20-33.
- Bierman, Scott, Luis Fernandez. (1998), Game Theory with Economic Applications, NewYork: Addison- Wesley.
- Blanchard, Oliver, Stanley Fischer, (1989), Lectures on Macroeconomics, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Blinder, Alan. (1999), “Central Bank Credibility? Why Do We Care? How Do We Built İt?”, NBER, No.w7161.
- Cukierman, Alex, (1994), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Cukierman Alex, Steven Webb, Bilin Neyapti, (1992), “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol.6, Number. 3.
- Debelle, G. and Fischer, S. (1994) , “How Independent Should a Central Bank Be”, Editör:Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Dincer, A. (2004). “A Comparison of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the European Central Bank in Terms of Independence” Iktisat, Isletme ve Finans, July 2004, pp.95-105.
- Fraser, G.W., (1994) “Central Bank Independence: What Does It Mean?”, Talk by the Governor to the 20 th Seanza Central Banking Course, Karachi, 23 November, pp:1-8.
- Hayo, Bernd, (1997) “Inflation Culture, Central Indepence and Price Stability”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol:14, pp.241-263.
- Kissmer, Friedrich, Wagner, Helmut., (1998), “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance a Survey of the Evidence”, Fern Universitat Hagen Diskussionsbeitrag Nr.255, pp:1-51.
- McCallum, B.T., (1995) “Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank”, American Economic Review, 85, pp.207-211.
- Newbold, P. (2000) İstatistiğe Giriş, Çev: Ü. Şenesen, İstanbul: Literatür
- Persson, Torsten, Guida Tabellini. (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Policies, New-York: Hardward Economic Publishers.
- Pollard, Patricia S, (1993) “Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance” Review of Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, Vol. 75, Issue 4
- Rogoff, Kenneth. (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, Quartely Journal of Economics, pp.1169-1189.
- Samuel Gorowitz, (1994), “John Ralws: Bir Adalet Kuramı”, Çev: Serap Can, Çağdaş Siyaset Felsefecileri, Remzi Kitapevi, ss.267-281.
- Schlutz, Christian, (1996) “ Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy”, Oxford Economic Paper, 48,5, pp:675-679.
| APA | BAYDUR C, SÜSLÜ B (2008). The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. , 31 - 49. |
| Chicago | BAYDUR Cem Mehmet,SÜSLÜ BORA The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. (2008): 31 - 49. |
| MLA | BAYDUR Cem Mehmet,SÜSLÜ BORA The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. , 2008, ss.31 - 49. |
| AMA | BAYDUR C,SÜSLÜ B The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. . 2008; 31 - 49. |
| Vancouver | BAYDUR C,SÜSLÜ B The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. . 2008; 31 - 49. |
| IEEE | BAYDUR C,SÜSLÜ B "The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience." , ss.31 - 49, 2008. |
| ISNAD | BAYDUR, Cem Mehmet - SÜSLÜ, BORA. "The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience". (2008), 31-49. |
| APA | BAYDUR C, SÜSLÜ B (2008). The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 22(1), 31 - 49. |
| Chicago | BAYDUR Cem Mehmet,SÜSLÜ BORA The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 22, no.1 (2008): 31 - 49. |
| MLA | BAYDUR Cem Mehmet,SÜSLÜ BORA The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, vol.22, no.1, 2008, ss.31 - 49. |
| AMA | BAYDUR C,SÜSLÜ B The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2008; 22(1): 31 - 49. |
| Vancouver | BAYDUR C,SÜSLÜ B The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience. Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2008; 22(1): 31 - 49. |
| IEEE | BAYDUR C,SÜSLÜ B "The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience." Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 22, ss.31 - 49, 2008. |
| ISNAD | BAYDUR, Cem Mehmet - SÜSLÜ, BORA. "The Independence of Central Bank: The Turkish Experience". Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 22/1 (2008), 31-49. |
