Any philosopher who does not want to compromise the certainty, objectivity and universality of knowledge, perceives the sceptical arguments which are put forward by Descartes and Hume as threats against the possibility of knowledge. While Descartes’ sceptical argument brings to light the possiblity of an error which accompanies all our claims of knowledge, Hume’s argument, on the other hand reduces all necessity which is thought to exist between cause and effect into a sceptical contingency. Thus both arguments are seen as obstacles which have to be overcomed in order to establish knowledge. However the present work wishes to show these arguments not as obstacles which we have to overcome but as experiments that allow suspicion and knowledge to live together. Moreover we conclude that these arguments will abolish the assumed sharp edged contrariness between doubt and knowledge and instead of expelling doubt out of knowledge they will show respect to suspicion by making it one of the fundamental elements of knowledge