DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?
Yıl: 2019 Cilt: 0 Sayı: 18 Sayfa Aralığı: 27 - 27 Metin Dili: İngilizce DOI: 54 İndeks Tarihi: 05-06-2020
DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?
Öz: The financial crisis of 2007-8 has focusedincreasing attention on the accountabilityof directors. Demands of greateraccountability has given further impetuson shareholder empowerment. However,inparticular, director primacy theoryfiercely advocates limiting shareholderpower because shareholder participationundermines the board authority to managecompany freely and forces the board to actin the interests of shareholders rather thanin the long-term interes ts of the company.The UK perspective has not enjoyed anysustained examination of the relationshipbetween shareholder power and the boardauthority.This paper examines the amendment ofarticles of association, shareholders’ reservepower, the appointment and removal ofdirectors, executive remuneration andtakeover regulations in the UK and theboard authority under UK case law, andargues that shareholder power does notundermine the authority of the board andthese two concepts are compatible witheach other.
Anahtar Kelime: İngiliz Şirketler Hukukunda Pay Sahiplerinin Yönetime Katilma Yetkisi Yönetim Kurulunun Otoritesini Zayıflatır Mı?
Öz: 2007-8 Finansal Krizi şirket yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hesap verebilirliği kavramını gündeme getirmiştir. Şirket yönetim kurulu üyelerinin daha fazla hesap verebilirliğini sağlamak için pay sahiplerinin yetkilerinin artırılması gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Fakat, özellikle yönetim kurulu üyelerinin üstünlüğünü savunan görüşe göre pay sahiplerinin yönetime katılması yönetim kurulunu etkisiz hale getireceğinden ve yönetim kurulunu sadece pay sahiplerinin kısa dönemli menfaatlerine odaklanmasını sağlayacağından pay sahiplerinin gücünün kısıtlanması gerekmektedir. İngiliz şirketler hukukunda pay sahiplerinin yetkileri ile yönetim kurulunun otoritesi (yetkileri) arasındaki ilişki yeterince incelenmemiştir. Bu çalışmada pay sahiplerinin ana sözleşme değişikliği, pay sahiplerinin saklı yetkisi, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin atanması ve görevden alınması, yöneticilerin ücret düzenlemesi, şirket devralma düzenlemesi ve yönetim kurulunun otoritesine ilişkin İngiliz Mahkeme Kararları incelenecektir. Bu makale, pay sahiplerinin yönetime katılma haklarının yönetim kurulunun otoritesini zayıflatmadığını ve bu iki kavramın birbiriyle uyumlu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.
Anahtar Kelime: Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Derleme Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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| APA | SOLAK E (2019). DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?. , 27 - 27. 54 |
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| IEEE | SOLAK E "DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?." , ss.27 - 27, 2019. 54 |
| ISNAD | SOLAK, Ekrem. "DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?". (2019), 27-27. https://doi.org/54 |
| APA | SOLAK E (2019). DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?. Law and Justice Review, 0(18), 27 - 27. 54 |
| Chicago | SOLAK Ekrem DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?. Law and Justice Review 0, no.18 (2019): 27 - 27. 54 |
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| AMA | SOLAK E DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?. Law and Justice Review. 2019; 0(18): 27 - 27. 54 |
| Vancouver | SOLAK E DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?. Law and Justice Review. 2019; 0(18): 27 - 27. 54 |
| IEEE | SOLAK E "DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?." Law and Justice Review, 0, ss.27 - 27, 2019. 54 |
| ISNAD | SOLAK, Ekrem. "DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?". Law and Justice Review 18 (2019), 27-27. https://doi.org/54 |
