The position of the example in Foucault’s text is related to how, in the very text of Foucault’s, the ‘example’ is posited. The possibility for setting such a position manifests itself if one departs from Agamben’s definition of Foucauldian archaeology as paradigmatology: Insofar as paradigmatology indicates to the posited dispositifs as the arrangements of discourse, archaeology too then examines the positions of dispositifs qua paradigms. Agamben shows how this discursive disposition as the position of paradigm transfers itself to Foucault’s text back from Hegel via the concept of positivity. By means of this transfer, one notices a link that positivity carries from Hegel to Foucault, namely the link between life and discourse. Foucault’s statement which separates discourse from life in Archaeology of Knowledge posits itself in a suspended interdependence where, in Foucault’s example on truth, in his reading of the example of telling the truth in Plato’s VII. Letter, in the example of parrhēsia, the relation between telling the truth and telling it boldly, the relation between discourse and practice, and lastly the relation between word and deed becomes undecided. This undecided relation locates the example of truth parrhēsia in a topos of speech-act. When this topic represents itself in the example of parrhēsia as basanos (which illustrates the philosopher as being the touchstone which experiences the truth) that Foucault through Plato and Plato through Socrates tells, it also, in the suspended interdependence that is created by the telling of the example, the truth of which cannot be represented in the writing, but nevertheless accounted through the text of a letter, shows that: when the locus that Socrates assigns to logos by excluding writing, together with the locus that Plato assigns to truth by excluding both logos and writing, is used by Foucault in order to give the example of telling the truth, these examples are no longer out of the position of Foucault’s text — no longer out of the position of the text. While Plato and Socrates become examples for Foucault, text and discourse, discourse and life, life and truth, truth and the courage of saying the truth becomes each of them examples to one another by connecting each other in a suspended interdependence where they posit the position of the example in Foucault’s text.