A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya

Köse, Talha; Öztürk, Bilgehan

doi:10.25253/99.2020224.08

A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya

TALHA KÖSE, (İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Türkiye)

BİLGEHAN ÖZTÜRK (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı,Türkiye)

Insight Turkey

4 0

Yıl: 2020 Cilt: 22 Sayı: 4 Sayfa Aralığı: 113 - 138 Metin Dili: İngilizce DOI: 10.25253/99.2020224.08 İndeks Tarihi: 26-05-2021

A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya

Öz:

T External interventions by both regional and global powers in Libyahave not been a scarcity after the 2011 revolution. With the turn of 2014,however, the nature of external interventions became more of a militaryone especially with the imposition of Haftar’s rule in the east by severalcounter-revolutionary regional and global actors. At the point that thesame counter-revolutionary alliance attempted to geopolitically strangulate Turkey both via propping up hostile and authoritarian regimes in theMiddle East and North Africa, and also excluding it from the prospect ofexploiting the riches of the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish interventionmaterialized in early 2020. This study attempts to explain the various motivations of the major intervening actors in Libya, namely France, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE with a special focus on Turkey. Structural realistperspective is used to elucidate the international interventions to the Libyan civil war. The nature of the uncertainty emanating from the regionaltransformation motivated the key actors to get militarily involved in theLibyan crisis. The actors with defensive motives are more likely to stick tothe conflict despite the risks of escalation.

Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık

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APA	Köse T, Öztürk B (2020). A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. , 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
Chicago	Köse Talha,Öztürk Bilgehan A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. (2020): 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
MLA	Köse Talha,Öztürk Bilgehan A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. , 2020, ss.113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
AMA	Köse T,Öztürk B A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. . 2020; 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
Vancouver	Köse T,Öztürk B A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. . 2020; 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
IEEE	Köse T,Öztürk B "A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya." , ss.113 - 138, 2020. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
ISNAD	Köse, Talha - Öztürk, Bilgehan. "A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya". (2020), 113-138. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020224.08

APA	Köse T, Öztürk B (2020). A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. Insight Turkey, 22(4), 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
Chicago	Köse Talha,Öztürk Bilgehan A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. Insight Turkey 22, no.4 (2020): 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
MLA	Köse Talha,Öztürk Bilgehan A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. Insight Turkey, vol.22, no.4, 2020, ss.113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
AMA	Köse T,Öztürk B A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. Insight Turkey. 2020; 22(4): 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
Vancouver	Köse T,Öztürk B A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya. Insight Turkey. 2020; 22(4): 113 - 138. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
IEEE	Köse T,Öztürk B "A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya." Insight Turkey, 22, ss.113 - 138, 2020. 10.25253/99.2020224.08
ISNAD	Köse, Talha - Öztürk, Bilgehan. "A Sea Change in the MENA Region: External Interventions in Libya". Insight Turkey 22/4 (2020), 113-138. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020224.08