Yıl: 2020 Cilt: 6 Sayı: 1 Sayfa Aralığı: 55 - 72 Metin Dili: İngilizce DOI: 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4 İndeks Tarihi: 26-05-2022

Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model

Öz:
A conventional assumption that deserves testing is that small and medium-sized en- terprises (SMEs) are most affected by credit crunch. In this respect, a disequilibrium model is designed to analyse the determinants of credit rationing upon a balanced panel of 2,370 mature French SMEs over the period 2002-2010. According to the esti- mates of simultaneous equations, the desired demand for bank credit is determined by exogenous factors from the supply-side. The credit supply-side validates best trade-off theory, whereas the credit demand-side validates best pecking order theory. The aver- age share of rationed SMEs is seven per cent of the sample, suggesting that access to bank loans is not a major issue for mature French SMEs.
Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA Adair P, ADASKOU M (2020). Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. , 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
Chicago Adair Philippe,ADASKOU Mohamed Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. (2020): 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
MLA Adair Philippe,ADASKOU Mohamed Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. , 2020, ss.55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
AMA Adair P,ADASKOU M Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. . 2020; 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
Vancouver Adair P,ADASKOU M Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. . 2020; 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
IEEE Adair P,ADASKOU M "Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model." , ss.55 - 72, 2020. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
ISNAD Adair, Philippe - ADASKOU, Mohamed. "Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model". (2020), 55-72. https://doi.org/10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
APA Adair P, ADASKOU M (2020). Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. World Journal of Applied Economics, 6(1), 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
Chicago Adair Philippe,ADASKOU Mohamed Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. World Journal of Applied Economics 6, no.1 (2020): 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
MLA Adair Philippe,ADASKOU Mohamed Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. World Journal of Applied Economics, vol.6, no.1, 2020, ss.55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
AMA Adair P,ADASKOU M Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. World Journal of Applied Economics. 2020; 6(1): 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
Vancouver Adair P,ADASKOU M Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model. World Journal of Applied Economics. 2020; 6(1): 55 - 72. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
IEEE Adair P,ADASKOU M "Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model." World Journal of Applied Economics, 6, ss.55 - 72, 2020. 10.22440/wjae.6.1.4
ISNAD Adair, Philippe - ADASKOU, Mohamed. "Credit Rationing and Mature French SMEs: A Disequilibrium Model". World Journal of Applied Economics 6/1 (2020), 55-72. https://doi.org/10.22440/wjae.6.1.4